The Burden of Dual Roles: Power Dynamics and Constitutional Interpretation in Superior Judiciary of Pakistan & AJK

Abstract

The absence of separate constitutional courts in Pakistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K) imposes a significant burden on the superior judiciary, requiring judges to engage in both statutory and constitutional interpretation. Pakistan recently established constitutional benches to bridge this loophole, but this constructive initiative has not been extended to AJ&K. The distinct legal processes necessitate different approaches and considerations, yet the dual role of judges diminishes the overall effectiveness of the judiciary. Additionally, conflicts of interest arise from the judges’ involvement in supreme judicial councils, complicating the impartial enforcement of judicial conduct standards. Furthermore, the principle of natural justice is often undermined in contempt of court proceedings, where judges act as both complainants and adjudicators. The constitutional frameworks of both regions confer extensive powers on the superior judiciary, amplifying their responsibilities and intensifying judicial pressures. This study employs a descriptive and analytical methodology to critically examine the scope and challenges of judicial authority in Pakistan and AJ&K. It proposes the establishment of specialized constitutional courts to exclusively address constitutional matters, alongside recommendations for enhancing the fairness, efficiency, and impartiality of the superior judiciary.